Long before Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi drew Beijing¡¯s ire by stating the obvious ¡ª that a Chinese military assault on Taiwan could be seen as an existential threat to Japan under the 1951 U.S.-Japan security agreement ¡ª Washington and its allies had been weighing the risks of just such an assault and China¡¯s overall military capabilities.

Toward that goal, the U.S. Department of Defense¡¯s annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People¡¯s Republic of China is among the most comprehensive and detailed assessments of China¡¯s military posture. The 2025 report, released in December, states clearly that, for a quarter century, ¡°these reports have chronicled the development of China¡¯s military capabilities and strategy.¡±

While the Trump administration¡¯s new report contains several noteworthy findings, one assessment has drawn particular attention: the conclusion that China deployed the DF-27 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) armed with a conventional (rather than nuclear) warhead in 2024. As discussed below, the deployment of the DF-27 appears to significantly complement China¡¯s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) posture, but this might have paradoxical effects on the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.