The last year has solidified China¡¯s status as one of the most salient foreign-policy challenges facing Europe. But it has been a long time coming. In fact, China¡¯s emergence at the forefront of debate in Europe is the product of three political realizations that have occurred since 2020.

The first was the recognition, triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, that Europe had become dependent on China for a wide range of goods. After decades of single-mindedly pursuing comparative advantage by relocating industries, including polluting industries, beyond its borders, Europe had to face hard facts. Distance might not matter anymore, but geopolitics does. And a product that is not strategic can quickly become so if a crisis erupts, if production or trade is disrupted, or if a single producer gains monopoly power.

But the pandemic, with its shortages of ordinary-turned-critical goods like masks and chemical reagents, was just the beginning. The stakes have since risen considerably, because China has a virtual monopoly over the production and/or refining of raw materials essential to the clean-energy transition. There is no ready-made solution to this challenge. Both vigilance and political prudence will be necessary.